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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Defendant-Appellant Richard A. Leavitt ("Leavitt") has filed a Notice of Appeal
(R., pp.24-27) challenging "the issuance of the death warrant entered by the Honorable
Jon Shindurling, District Judge of the Seventh Judicial District in and for the State of
Idaho" (R., p.25). Because this Court is without jurisdiction to hearing Leavitt's appeal,
the state is asking that it be dismissed.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In Leavitt's Statement of the Case, he makes a number of "factual" assertions
without citation to the underlying record, many of which are not supported by the record.
(Brief, pp.1-3.)

While the state recognizes Leavitt's case has a long and protracted

history, the vast majority of that history is not before this Court and the record does not
indicate any party requested the district court or this Court to take judicial notice of the
underlying records or transcripts. Therefore, the state will rely upon the record as it
exists before this Court and the published decisions associated with Leavitt's first-degree
murder of Danette Elg and imposition of the death penalty for that murder.
In 1984, Danette was "brutally attacked in her bed," suffering "up to fifteen
separate slash and stab wounds, some of which proved fatal. Her body had been further
brutalized by the slashing removal of her sexual organs." State v. Leavitt (Leavitt I), 116
Idaho 285, 287, 775 P .2d 599 (1989). A jury found Leavitt guilty of first-degree murder.
State v. Leavitt (Leavitt III), 141 Idaho 895, 896, 120 P.3d 283 (2005). In 1986, Leavitt
filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the district court after an
1

evidentiary hearing. Id. at 897. In a consolidated appeal, this Court affirmed Leavitt's
conviction for first-degree murder and the denial of post-conviction relief, but reversed
his death sentence because the trial court failed to "detail any adequate consideration of
the 'mitigating factors' considered, and whether or not the 'mitigating circumstances'
outweigh the gravity of any 'aggravating circumstance' so as to make unjust the
imposition of the death penalty." Leavitt I, 116 Idaho at 607. The state's Petition for
Certiorari was denied October 16, 1989. Idaho v. Leavitt, 493 U.S. 923 (1989).
Upon remand the district court held another sentencing hearing. State v. Leavitt
(Leavitt II), 121 Idaho 4, 4, 822 P.2d 523 (1993). Following the hearing, the court found
a single statutory aggravating factor - I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5) - weighed the collective
mitigation against the statutory aggravator, and again sentenced Leavitt to death. Id. l
The Register of Actions indicates the Judgment was filed April 6, 1990. (R., p.l.) On
January 23, 1992, this Court affirmed Leavitt's death sentence. Leavitt II, 121 Idaho 4,
822 P.2d 523. Leavitt's Petition for Certiorari was denied on November 9, 1992. Leavitt
v. Idaho, 506 U.S. 972 (1992).
Leavitt filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal district court. Leavitt
v. Arave, 646 F.3d 605,607 (9 th Cir. 2011). The district court granted habeas relief based
upon an alleged improper jury instruction given at Leavitt's trial, Leavitt v. Arave, 383
F.3d 809, 816-26 (9 th Cir. 2004), but denied relief on his remaining habeas claims. Both
parties appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court's
decision regarding the jury instruction, but affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims

I Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(5), which has been recodified to I.C. § 19-2515(9)(e), reads as
follows, "The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity."
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with the exception of Leavitt's ineffective assistance of counsel claims stemming from
his resentencing, which were remanded for the district court to "consider," id. at 826-841.
On remand, the district court concluded Leavitt's resentencing attorney was ineffective
by "failing to investigate Leavitt's mental health before the second sentencing hearing."
Leavitt, 646 F.3d at 608. The court issued a conditional writ stating, in part, ""the Writ
shall issue and the State of Idaho shall be enjoined from carrying out a death sentence
against Petitioner unless it initiates a new sentencing proceeding within 120 days of the
date of this Judgment." (R., p.23.) The state appealed, and on May 17, 2011, the Ninth
Circuit reversed. Leavitt, 646 F.3d at 616. Leavitt's Petition for Certiorari was denied
May 14, 2012. Leavitt v. Arave, --- U.S. ---, 2012 WL 509134 (2012). The Ninth
Circuit's Mandate was issued May 16,2012. (R., p.17.)
While his federal habeas case was pending, based upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 F.3d
585 (2002), Leavitt filed a successive post-conviction petition contending his death
sentence must be vacated because the district court, rather than a jury, found the statutory
aggravating factor upon which his death sentence was based. Leavitt III, 141 Idaho at
897. Leavitt also filed a Rule 35 motion based upon Ring. Both the successive petition
and Rule 35 motion were rejected by the district court, and Leavitt's appeals were
dismissed by this Court pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719. Leavitt III, at 897-98.
Apparently anticipating the issuance of a new death warrant as a result of the
Supreme Court's denial of his Petition for Certiorari, on May 15, 2012, Leavitt filed a
Notice of Demand for Opportunity to be Heard in his underlying criminal case,
conceding no stay of execution was in place and that the previous judgment of death had
not been executed, but contending legal reasons exist against the execution of judgment
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because his "case has been subject to the Orders of the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho, issued pursuant to the federal habeas corpus action" and the warrant
should not issue because he had "filed an additional petition for relief in the federal
habeas case referenced above." (R., pp.6-7.) On May 17, 2012, at 10:50 a.m., based
upon I.C. § 19-2515(5), which was amended in 2012 (Appendix A), and Leavitt's failure
to assert a stay of execution was in place or dispute the existence of a death sentence,
Judge Shindurling denied Leavitt's motion, explaining, "Further action by this Court is
ministerial only and '[n]o hearing shall be required for setting a new execution date and
the court shall inquire only into the fact of an existing death sentence and the absence of a
valid stay of execution.'" (R., p.10) (quoting I.C. § 19-2715(5).) On May 17, 2012, at
approximately 11 :28 a.m. a new Death Warrant was file stamped, which had been signed
by Judge Shindurling, setting Leavitt's execution for June 12,2012. (R., pp.12-15.)
On May 18,2012, Leavitt filed a Motion to Reconsider contending his execution
is "barred by the permanent injunction of the federal court, which is not 'a temporary
postponement of an execution'" and that Judge Shindurling should have proceeded
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2715(4).

(R., pp.17-18.)

Leavitt's conclusion that there is a

"permanent injunction of the federal court" is based upon the federal district court's
September 28, 2007 Judgment granting Leavitt resentencing habeas relief. (Id.) Judge
Shindurling denied Leavitt's motion on May 21, 2012. (R., pp.28-30.)
Leavitt filed his Notice of Appeal on May 21, 2012, contending he is appealing
"from the issuance of the death warrant entered by the Honorable Jon Shindurling,
District Judge of the Seventh Judicial District in and for the State of Idaho, on May 17,
2012." (R., pp.24-27.)
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ISSUES

Leavitt has stated the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Whether the ex parte issuance of a death warrant after a request by
Defendant's counsel to be present and to be heard denies
Defendant his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

2.

Whether the District Court failed to apply Idaho Code § 192715(4) in determining that he only had jurisdiction to sign the
death warrant.

3.

Whether a Deputy Attorney General who has not appeared in the
case has authority to apply for a death warrant before the District
Court.

4.

Whether the issuance of the death warrant violated Idaho Criminal
Rule 38(a) because review of the death sentence is still pending in
United States District Court.

5.

Whether the District Court erred in failing to make a verbatim
transcript of the in-chambers proceedings in regard to the issuance
of the death warrant.

(Brief, pA.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:
Because the Death Warrant from which Leavitt appeals is not an appealable order,
is this Court without jurisdiction to hear his appeal?
Alternatively,
Has Leavitt waived the claim that constitutional protections apply when the
district court issues a new death warrant because he has failed to provide authority and
argument to support his claim?
Alternatively,
Because of the ministerial nature of obtaining a death warrant under I.C. § 192715, has Leavitt failed to establish constitutional protections attach when the state
applies for a death warrant and, if such rights do attach, whether they were violated when
the district court issued the Death Warrant ex parte?

5

ARGUMENT
1.
This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Hear Leavitt's Appeal Because A Death Warrant Is
Not An Appealable Order

A.

Introduction
Criminal appeals are governed by 1.A.R. II(c). Because the issuance of a death

warrant is not an appealable order, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear
Leavitt's instant appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether an appeal is taken from an appealable order implicates the subject

matter jurisdiction of this Court; thus, it can be raised at any time by the parties or by the
Court sua sponte. Further it is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. The
interpretation of a statute is also a question of law this Court reviews de novo." State v.
Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 865,264 P.3d 970 (2011).

C.

Leavitt's Death Warrant Is Not An Appealable Order
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c) delineates which judgments and orders are appealable

in a criminal action, as follows:
1.

Final judgments of conviction.

2.
An order granting or denying a withheld jUdgment on a
verdict or plea of guilty.
3.
complaint.

An order granting a motion to dismiss an information or

4.
Any order or judgment, whenever entered and however
denominated, terminating a criminal action, provided that this provision
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shall not authorize a new trial in any case where the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy would otherwise prevent a second trial.
5.
Any order, however denominated, reducing a charge of
criminal conduct over the objection of the prosecutor.
6.
Any judgment imposing sentence after conviction, except a
sentence imposing the death penalty, which shall not be appealable until
the death warrant is issued as provided by statute.
7.

An order granting a motion to suppress evidence.

8.

An order granting or denying a motion for new trial.

9.
Any order made after judgment affecting the substantial
rights of the defendant or the state.
10.
Decisions by the district court on criminal appeals from a
magistrate, either dismissing the appeal or affirming, reversing or
remanding.
A death warrant is clearly not one of the delineated orders listed in LA.R. 11 (c).
Undoubtedly, Leavitt will contend a death warrant is an "order made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." I.A.R. 11(c)(9). In State v. Gardner,
234 P .3d 1104 (Utah 2010), the Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining:
The issuance of an execution warrant is the ministerial direction that the
sentence of death already imposed be implemented; it is neither a
judgment of conviction nor an order that affects the rights of the
defendant. The sentence itself is the judgment from which an appeal may
be taken, and an order to execute the sentence is not itself a sentence.

IIIII'

In State v. Campbell, 770 P.2d 620, 622 (Wash. 1989), the defendant also
challenged the issuance of a death warrant, contending it was a "final order made after

1.[1

I

judgment which affects a substantial right." Recognizing that while a death warrant is a
final order entered after judgment, the Washington Supreme Court nevertheless
concluded, "it does not affect a substantial right within the meaning of this rule," and
dismissed the appeal. rd.
7

Likewise, I.C. § 19-2715(5) establishes that issuance of a death warrant is
"ministerial" only. "No hearing shall be required for setting a new execution date and the
court shall inquire only into the fact of an existing death sentence and the absence of a
valid stay of execution." Id. Leavitt's "substantial rights" are not at issue because his
conviction and death sentence have been repeatedly challenged. However, the state and
federal courts have rejected those challenges and concluded neither the conviction nor
death sentence are unconstitutional. Therefore, because the Death Warrant is not an
appealable order, Leavitt's appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

II.
Leavitt Has Failed To Establish A Constitutional Violation Associated With The District
Court Issuing The New Death Warrant Ex Parte
A.

Introduction
Leavitt contends that "issuance of the death warrant without providing [him]

notice so that his counsel could appear and contest the issuance of the death warrant
violated his constitutional rights," and that if his attorneys had been provided the
opportunity to be heard they would have raised "all of the specific issues addressed below
which would have resulted in the district court's denial of the state's application for a
warrant at this time and for the date now set." (Brief, p.5.)
Because Leavitt has provided no authority establishing he is entitled to due
process or the right to counsel at the time the Death Warrant was issued, his claim fails.
Moreover, because issuance of a death warrant does not implicate Leavitt's rights to due
process or counsel, his claim fails. Finally, because the "specific issues" Leavitt raises
would not have barred issuance of the Death Warrant, his claim fails.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"

The standard of review applicable to constitutional issues such as due process
violations is one of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but
free review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts
found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2003); State v.
Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

Leavitt's Constitutional Claims Have Been Waived
The only authority upon which Leavitt relies for his constitutional challenge is

cases that, in general fashion, regurgitate the "heightened scrutiny" afforded capital
defendants. (Brief, p.5) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976);
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-30 (1985); Leavitt I, 116 Idaho at 288); he
has provided no authority that obtaining a death warrant ex parte violates the federal or
Idaho constitutions.
Therefore, because Leavitt has failed to support his claims with authority and
argument, they are waived. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170 (1999)
(citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966 (1996)); State v. Creech, 132
Idaho 1, 19, 966 P.2d 1 (1998). Permitting death-sentenced inmates to merely support
claims on appeal with general law regarding "heightened scrutiny" and the steady beat
that "death is different" would eliminate the underlying principles associated with basic
appellate rules, including the requirement that claims be supported with authority and
argument. Leavitt should be required to provide authority that is directly relevant to the
issue before this Court.
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D.

Leavitt Was Not Entitled To Additional Constitutional Protections Associated
With Issuance Of The Death Warrant
Presumably Leavitt failed to provide any authority for his constitutional argument

because none exists. Similarly, in Marek v. State, 14 So.3d 985, 998 (Fla. 2009), a deathsentenced inmate contended the manner in which the death warrant was issued violated
his constitutional rights. After recognizing the defendant had "not provided any authority
holding that he must be provided notice before a death warrant is signed or that the
Governor many not sign the death warrant of an individual whose death sentence is final
and who has had the benefit of a clemency proceedings," the court reviewed Ohio Adult
Parole Authority v. Woodland, 523 U.S 272 (1998), and concluded "some minimal
procedural due process requirements should apply to clemency proceedings. But none of
the opinions in that case required any specific procedures or criteria to guide the
executive's signing of warrants for death-sentenced inmates."
The federal district court agreed, concluding, "under Federal law, Florida has not
created a protected interest in life or liberty with respect to clemency proceedings; and,
assuming such proceedings can be analogized to the ex parte contacts and consideration
that proceeded the Governor's issuance of the death warrant, Petitioner cannot maintain a
due process claim arising from the process of which he complains." Marek v. McNeil,
2009 WL 2488296, *3 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (footnotes omitted). Expressly, addressing the
Governor's signing of the death warrant, the court explained:
In Woodard, the Supreme Court recognized that a capital defendant has a
"residual life interest" after his sentencing, but that he "cannot use his
interest in not being executed in accord with his sentence to challenge the
clemency determination by requiring [certain] procedural protections .... "
523 U.S. 272, 281, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court also recognized in Woodard that where a governor is
afforded broad discretion by the state, then "[uJnder any analysis, the
10

governor's executive discretion need not be fettered by the types of
procedural protections sought by respondent." Id at 282 (emphasis
added).
Id. at *4. After considering these general constitutional principles and the absence of any
other authority, the court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's decision rejecting
Marek's claims was not unreasonable. Id.; see also Valle v. State, 70 So.3d 530, 552
(Fla. 2011) (rejecting a similar claim asking the court to second-guess the Governor's
decision in deciding when to sign a death warrant).
Likewise, Idaho has not created a protected interest in life or liberty with respect
to the issuance of a death warrant. Rather, it is a ministerial proceeding where only two
requirements must be met - "the fact of an existing death sentence and the absence of a
valid stay of execution." I.C. § 19-2715(5). Because Leavitt has failed to establish he
was entitled to greater constitutional protections, his claim fails.

E.

Leavitt's Argument Fails Because His "Specific Issues" Are Without Merit
As explained above, Leavitt's argument is premised upon the "specific issues

addressed below," which include four arguments he contends "would have resulted in the
district court's denial of the State's application for a warrant," including: (1) the district
court erred by not applying I.C. § 19-2715(4); (2) the Idaho Attorney General's Office
had no authority to apply for the warrant; (3) LC.R. 38(a) mandates a stay of the Death
Warrant as a review of the death sentence is pending; and (4) failing to provide a
verbatim transcript of the issuance of the warrant violates due process. Even if Leavitt
had been permitted to present his "specific issues" to the district court prior to issuance of
the Death Warrant, because each of these claims fails, Leavitt's argument regarding
alleged constitutional violations associated with issuance of the Death Warrant also fails.
11

l.

The Relevant Statute - I.e. § 19-2715

Leavitt takes great pains to parse I.C. § 19-2715. However, because the statute
must be read in context and as a whole, it is quoted verbatim as follows:
(1) Hereafter, no further stays of execution shall be granted to
persons sentenced to death except that a stay of execution shall be granted
during an appeal taken pursuant to section 19-2719, Idaho Code, during
the automatic review of judgments imposing the punishment of death
provided by section 19-2827, Idaho Code, by order of a federal court or as
part of a commutation proceeding pursuant to section 20-240, Idaho Code.
(2) Upon remittitur or mandate after a sentence of death has been
affirmed, the state shall apply for a warrant from the district court in which
the conviction was had, authorizing execution of the judgment of death.
Upon such application, the district court shall set a new execution date not
more than thirty (30) days thereafter.
(3) If a stay of execution is granted pursuant to subsection (1) of
this section and as a result, no execution takes place on the date set by the
district court, upon termination of the stay, the state shall apply for another
warrant and upon such application, the district court shall set a new
execution date not more than thirty (30) days thereafter.
(4) If for any reason, other than those set forth in subsection (1) of
this section, a judgment of death has not been executed, and it remains in
force, the state shall apply for another warrant. Upon such application, the
district court may inquire into the facts, and if no legal reason exists
against the execution of the judgment, must make an order that the warden
execute the jUdgment at a special specified time. The warden must execute
the judgment accordingly.
(5) Action of the district court under this section is ministerial
only. No hearing shall be required for setting a new execution date and the
court shall inquire only into the fact of an existing death sentence and the
absence of a valid stay of execution.
(6) For purposes of this section, the phrase "stay of execution"
shall refer to a temporary postponement of an execution as a result of a
court order or an order of the governor postponing the execution while a
petition for commutation is pending.
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2.

The "Appropriate" Subsection OfLC. §19-2715

Leavitt contends the district court erred by not applying I.C. § 19-2715(4) and,
because the court allegedly utilized the wrong sub-section, abused its discretion, and he
was prejudiced because (1) "the court never made any inquiry into the facts surrounding
the status of the case," (2) "made no verbatim record of the matter," and (3) "refused to
allow counsel for Mr. Leavitt to appear or raise any objections to the issuance of the
warrant." (Brief, pp.6-9.) Leavitt's arguments are simply without merit.
First, Leavitt has failed to establish "the court never made any inquiry into the
facts surrounding the status of the case." Second, as explained in I.C. § 19-2715(5), the
only inquiry that is mandated is "the fact of an existing death sentence and the absence of
a valid stay of execution." In his Notice of Demand for Opportunity to be Heard, filed
before issuance of the Death Warrant, Leavitt conceded, "no 'stay of execution,' I.e. §
19-2715(6)[,] is in place" and "the judgment of death 'has not been executed.'" (R., p.6.)
While the district court "may inquire into the facts" under I.C. § 19-2715(4), those facts
undoubtedly involve the "reason" the 'judgment of death [had] not been executed."
However, irrespective of the reason, because there was an existing death sentence and the
absence of a valid stay of execution, whatever the "reason," not only was no further
inquiry mandated, but the court was still required to sign the Death Warrant.
Finally, Leavitt's two remaining arguments are subsumed in his other arguments.
As detailed below, a verbatim record was not required and, because Leavitt conceded the
only two inquiries required for issuance of a warrant, there was no basis for counsel to
appear and raise challenges - even if such a right exists, which the state denies.
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3.

The Idaho Attorney General's Office

Leavitt contends the Idaho Attorney General's office had no authority to apply for
the Death Warrant. (Brief, pp.9-13.) Ignoring the fact that there is nothing in the record
supporting Leavitt's claim regarding the Idaho Attorney General's involvement in
securing the Death Warrant, his claims still fails.
Leavitt's argument is premised upon statutes that govern the duties of prosecuting
attorneys, including I.e. §§ 31-2227 and 31-2604. Based upon those statutes, Leavitt
contends, because the Attorney General was not properly appointed, his actions "in
seeking the death warrant are void." (Brief, pp.9-12.) Not only has Leavitt failed to
provide any authority for the proposition that the actions of the Attorney General are
void, but he misinterprets the changes that were made to I.e. § 19-2715.
Prior to I.e § 19-2715 being amended, sub-section (3) read, "If for any reason a
judgment of death has not been executed, and it remains in force, the court in which the
conviction was had, on the application of the prosecuting attorney, must order the
defendant to be brought before it, or if he is at large a warrant for his apprehension may
be issued." (Emphasis added). In amending I.e. § 19-2715, the Legislature no longer
required the "application of the prosecuting attorney." Rather, "the state shall apply for
a warrant from the district court in which the conviction was had." I.e. § 19-2715(2)
(emphasis added). Obviously, if application of a death warrant was permitted only by the
prosecutor, the Legislature would not have changed the language of the statute to "the
state," but simply left the word "prosecutor" resulting in the relevant portion of the
statute stating, "the prosecutor shall apply for a warrant." As explained in Woodvine v.
Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 721, 682 P.2d 1263 (1984), "When the legislature

14

changes the language of a statute, it is presumed that they intended to change the
application or meaning of that statute."
The obvious reason for this Legislative change is that county prosecutors have no
authority to appear on behalf of the State of Idaho in federal habeas cases. Rather,
because the defendant in habeas cases is generally the warden where the petitioner is
imprisoned, see Rule 2(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, that responsibility lies
with the Attorney General. The Legislature recognized the Attorney General's Office
handles all of the appellate work in criminal cases, both before this Court and the federal
courts, and that it was more efficient to have the Attorney General obtain a death warrant
and to answer the two relevant questions under I.C. § 19-2715(5).
Based upon the changes to I.C. § 19-2715, there was no error associated with a
deputy attorney general making application for the Death Warrant.

4.

Idaho Criminal Rule 38(a)

Idaho Criminal Rule 38(a) states, "A sentence of death shall be stayed pending
any appeal or review." Based upon I.c.R. 38(a) and his pending motion in federal court
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), Leavitt contends, "this Court should vacate the death warrant
and enter its own stay of execution under Rule 38(a)." (Brief, p.l4.) Obviously, if
Leavitt desires this Court to issue a stay, he should file an appropriate motion, not make
such a request in his opening brief.
Presumably, Leavitt's true motive in making this argument is that if his attorneys
would have been provided the opportunity to be heard by the district court prior to
issuance of the Death Warrant, they would have contended his Rule 60(b) motion in
federal court warranted a stay under LC.R. 38(a).
15

However, LC.R. 38(a) has no

application to cases pending in federal court, but is a state rule that pennits a stay when a
case is being appealed in state court. Moreover, I.C.R. 38(a) is limited by I.e. § 19-2708,
which states, "No judge, court or officer, can suspend the execution of a judgment of
death, except as provided in sections 19-2715 and 19-2719." Idaho Code § 19-2715(1)
states, "Hereafter, no further stays of execution shall be granted to persons sentenced to
death except that a stay of execution shall be granted during an appeal taken pursuant to
section 19-2719, Idaho Code, during the automatic review of judgments imposing the
punishment of death provided by section 19-2827, Idaho Code, by order of a federal court
or as part of a commutation proceeding pursuant to section 20-240, Idaho Code."
Leavitt apparently contends there is a conflict between I.C.R. 38(a) and I.C. § 192708, and that I.C.R. 38(a) controls because "the rules of the courts ofIdaho control over
the statutes enacted by the Legislature when those rules concern procedural matters."
(Brief, p.14.) However, as explained above there is no conflict between I.C.R 38(a) and
I.C. § 19-2708. Moreover, even if such a conflict exists, "[b]ecause of the unique nature
of the death penalty, as provided in chapter 27, title 19, Idaho Code, as well as the
stringent constitutional protections afforded to a person sentenced to death," I.C. § 192708, which limits suspension of the execution of a judgment of death except as provided
in I.C. §§ 19-2715 and 19-2719, "is a substantive rule." State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,
864, 828 P.2d 891 (1992).

Otherwise, there would never be an execution in Idaho

because death-sentenced inmates would repeatedly file new cases for "review" and
"appeal," which, under I.C.R. 38(a), would result in an automatic stay and thwart the very
purpose for passage ofLe. § 19-2719. In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d
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678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the
passage ofI.C. § 19-2719:
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences."
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by
requiring that all collateral claims for relief ... be consolidated in one
proceeding .... " We hold that the legislature's determination that it was
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational
basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for I.C. § 19-2719.
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences.
Because I.C. § 19-2708 expressly references I.C. § 19-2719, there is simply no
basis for concluding I.C. § 19-2708 is not a substantive rule that governs when a death
sentence may be stayed.

5.

Verbatim Transcript

Based upon due process and I.C. § 1-1103, Leavitt contends, "A verbatim
transcript is required by this court to exercise its constitutional duty to review cases on
appeal." (Brief, p.l6.) Apart from the fact that this Court is without jurisdiction to hear
Leavitt's appeal, because application of a death warrant is a ministerial task, a verbatim
transcript was neither mandated nor warranted.
Idaho Code § 1-1103 states the reporter "shall correctly report all oral proceedings
had in said court and the testimony taken in all cases tried before said court." In State v.
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65, 90 P.3d 278 (2003), the defendant contended the court
reporter's failure to record telephone conferences and pre-trial conferences between
counsel and the court violated the statute. Rejecting the defendant's argument, this Court
explained, "It is basic to appellate practice that error will not be presumed, but must be
17

affirmatively shown by an appellant.

Furthermore, error in the abstract does not

necessarily rise to the level of constitutional dimension unless and until a defendant
properly presents a specific prejudice from such error." Id. (citations omitted).
Likewise, even if the chamber conference to obtain the Death Warrant should
have been recorded, an allegation the state vehemently denies, Leavitt has failed to
establish any prejudice, particularly in light of the fact that he conceded the only two
questions that are relevant to obtaining a death warrant - "the fact of an existing death
sentence and the absence of a valid stay of execution." I.C. § 19-2715(5).

6.

Leavitt Has Failed To Establish Prejudice

Idaho Criminal Rule 52 reads, "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." The four "specific issues" raised
by Leavitt fall within Rule 52 since, irrespective of whether (1) the district court erred by
allegedly not applying the correct sub-section, (2) a deputy attorney general should not
have applied for the Death Warrant, and (3) a "verbatim transcript" should have been
made, Leavitt's execution will still take place on June 12,2012, because the district court
will simply apply the correct sub-section, the Bingham County Prosecutor will apply for
the Death Warrant, and a verbatim transcript will be made establishing what Leavitt has
already conceded - there is "an existing death sentence and the absence of a valid stay of
execution." I.C. § 19-2715(5). Therefore, the district court will be mandated to issue the
same Death Warrant because there simply is "no legal reason" for the district court to
deny an application for issuance of the warrant, unless this Court concludes that LC.R.
38(a) requires the issuance of a stay every time some kind of new "review" is launched
by an Idaho death-sentenced murderer.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests Leavitt's appeal be dismissed or, alternatively, that
issuance of the Death Warrant be affirmed.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2012.

Deputy Attorney General and
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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Sixty-first Legislature
IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1266
BY JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE
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AN ACT
RELATING TO EXECUTION; AMENDING SECTION 19-2715, IDAHO CODE, TO ESTABLISH
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO A STAY OF EXECUTION, TO REVISE PROVISIONS AND TO ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN WARRANTS, TO ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO RESETTING EXECUTION DATES AND TO DEFINE A PHRASE; DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
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SECTION 1. That Section 19-2715, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:
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19-2715.
MINISTERIAL ACTIONS RELATING TO STAYS OF EXECUTION, RESETTING EXECUTION DATES, AND ORDER FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF DEATH. (1) Hereafter, no further stays of execution shall be granted to persons sentenced to
death except that a stay of execution shall be granted during an appeal taken
pursuant to section 19-2719, Idaho Code, ttaa during the automatic review
of judgments imposing the punishment of death provided by section 19-2827,
Idaho Code, by order of a federal court or as part of a commutation proceeding
pursuant to section 20-240, Idaho Code.
(2) Upon remi tti tur or mandate after a sentence of death has been affirmed, the state shall apply for a warrant from the district court in which
the conviction was had, authorizing execution of the judgment of death. Upon
such application, the district court shall set a new execution date not more
than thirty (30) days thereafter.
(3) If a stay of execution is granted pursuant to subsection (1) of this
section and as a resul t, no execution takes place on the date set by the district court, upon termination of the stay, the state shall apply for another
warrant and upon such application, the district court shall set a new execution date not more than thirty (30) days thereafter.
i l l If for any reason, other than those set forth in subsection (1) of
this section, a judgment of death has not been executed, and it remains in
force, the state shall apply for another warrant. Upon such application,
the district court in Hhieh the eonviction ',.'as had, on the application of the
prosecuting attorney, must order the defendant to be brought before it, or
if he is at large a '",arrant for his apprehension may be issued. Upon the de
fendant being brew:ght before the eourt, the eourt must may inquire into the
facts, and if no legal reason exists against the execution of the judgment,
must make an order that the warden execute the judgment at a special specified time. The warden must execute the judgment accordingly.
(4~)
Action of the district court under this section is ministerial
only. No hearing shall be required for setting a new execution date and the
court shall inquire only into the fact of an existing death sentence and the
absence of a valid stay of execution.
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2
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i l l For purposes of this section, the phrase "stay of execution" shall
refer to a temporary postponement of an execution as a result of a court order or an order of the governor postponing the execution while a petition for
commutation is pending.
SECTION 2. An emergency exi sting therefor, which emergency is hereby
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its
passage and approval, and retroactively to January 1,2012.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS21016
This amendment seeks to clarify the process of obtaining a death warrant, including specifying
a time during which the warrant must be obtained, sets forth a process for obtaining successive
warrants if necessary, and clarifies responsibilities if an execution does not proceed. Some language
was changed to reflect federal practices.

FISCAL NOTE
There is no fiscal impact.

Contact:
Name: Brent Reinke, Director
Office: Department of Correction
Phone: (208) 658-2l39

Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Note

S1266

MINUTES

SENATE JUDICIARY & RULES COMMITTEE
DATE:

Wednesday, January 25, 2012

TIME:

1:30 P.M.

PLACE:

Room WW54

MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Vick, Senators Davis, Lodge, Malloy
(McKague), Mortimer, Nuxoll, Bock, and LeFavour

ABSENTI
EXCUSED:
NOTE:

The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained with
the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and will then be
located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services Library.
Chairman Darrington called the meeting to order at 1:32 and asked the Secretary
to call the roll.

RS 20972

Relating to the State Victim Notification Fund. Mike Kane, representing the
Idaho Sheriff's Association, said they were proposing a way of obtaining sustainable
funding for the victim and witness notification system, known as VINE. The concept
is to add a $10 one-time fee at time of conviction for a misdemeanor or felony. It is
projected that this will raise enough money to maintain the program. Any excess
fees generated will be turned over to the Victim Restitution Fund. Chairman
Darrington stated that several years ago a constitutional amendment was passed
providing for victim notification. Mr. Kane said that was correct and this assists the
state and the local entities in fulfilling the constitutional function of keeping victims
notified of the status of the offenders. Chairman Darrington remarked that Mr.
Kane seemed to be pleased with the vendor and satisfied with the operation of the
program throughout the state and the fear was that it would be interrupted with the
absence of funding which would make us out of compliance. Mr. Kane said that
was correct. Vice Chairman Vick asked if they had approached JFAC for funding
as an alternative. Mr. Kane said they had sent an email to JFAC and given the
financial crisis at the time, they thought this was the best avenue.

MOTION

Senator Bock moved, seconded by Senator Nuxoll to print RS 20972. The
motion was carried by voice vote.

RS 20973

Relating to the Control of Veneral Diseases. Mike Kane explained the purpose
of this bill is to modernize the law regarding STD testing in correctional facilities by
adding appropriate STDs and eliminating another, and by reducing the need to test
for STOs in certain cases. Right now everyone in the state that is incarcerated must
be tested for venereal diseases. You will note that we have eliminated testing for
those with drug related charges in Section (4). That would mean that every juvenile
arrested with a small bag of marijuana or drug paraphernalia must be tested for
VD at a significant expense on the state and local correctional entities. There are
lots of other ways to test for venereal diseases including those who might share
bodily fluids. The second part is adding the most prevalent venereal disease in the
state which is chlamydia and also hepatitis C and eliminating chancroid, which is a
tropical disease.
Senator Malloy asked why "drug related" charges would be stricken from the
language since the sharing of needles is a very common way for the exchange of
bodily fluids, possibly causing STDs. Mr. Kane said that was right, however, if a
young person gets arrested for having marijuana or drug paraphernalia that would
have nothing to do with the exchange of bodily fluids. It's a significant burden on
the state and for that reason it should be eliminated from this section.

MOTION

Senator Nuxoll moved, seconded by Senator LeFavour to print RS 20973. The
motion carried by voice vote.

RS 21014

Relating to Execution. Brent Reinke, Director of Idaho Department of Correction
(IDGC), explained that Idaho recently carried out its first execution in 17 years.
During preparations to carry out this order, a few issues were discovered in Idaho's
death penalty statutes that needed to be addressed. As a result, the Department
and the Attorney General's office present a package of three statute changes.
Director Reinke gave an overview of the key procedural issues. Deputy Attorney
General Lamont Anderson will address two of these proposed amendments.
Director Reinke requested that Mark Kubinski, the lead Deputy Attorney General
for the Department of Correction, be allowed to speak to RS 21014.
Mark Kubinski explained that in 2009, there was an amendment to the Idaho
Code to remove the firing squad as an alternative means of execution. In addition,
language relating to an exemption from the practice of medicine and pharmacy was
also removed. As a result of the execution last November and that experience,
the Department is seeking to amend 19-2716 to reinsert those provisions and
to provide a statutory immunity for the individuals participating in executions.
Subsection (2) clarifies that carrying out an execution is not the practice of medicine
and that the director and those acting under his authority are exempt from any
legal departments governing the practice of medicine. Subsection (3) allows for
any entity authorized to possess controlled substances may distribute to the
director and also provides those entities with immunity from liability as a result
of the condemned person's death. Subsection (4) authorizes the director of the
department to contain, possess, and store controlled substances for purposes of
carrying out an execution and exempts the director from any legal requirements
governing pharmacy and controlled substances. He stated that also any individuals
participating in the execution are immune from civil or criminal liability as a result of
the death and would prevent a wrongful death action being brought against them.
Lastly, the proposed amendment contains an emergency clause.
Senator Davis asked if the language that was inserted was the same language
as before or something different. Mr. Kubinski said it was not identical, but it
was substantially similar with respect to the practice of medicine and pharmacy.
The immunity for providing chemicals to the department was not in the previous
version of the statute. Senator Davis suggested that Subsection (2) was pretty
broad about who could administer the drugs to the inmate. Mr. Kubinski said
that was not the intent of the statute and the corresponding administrative rules
and the department's standard operating procedure was more detailed in how
the execution was carried out. Senator Davis said he recognized that it said all
persons authorized by the director to participate in the execution, but he thought
there should be language that tied it to some administrative process for the director
in qualifying those persons to participate in the execution. Mr. Kubinski replied
that the language in Subsection (2) was in previous law prior to 2009.

illl

I

Senator Mortimer said he had some of those same concerns that Senator Davis
pointed out and thought it needed further clarification. Senator Bock asked to bring
back the Director for a question. He asked if there were limitations elsewhere in
statute as to who you might appoint to participate in the process. Director Reinke
replied there were not. He said although this is broad, it is outlined in the standard
of operating procedure and is extremely detailed. Senator Bock commented that
there wa$ no other authority in any other statute or rule that specifically limits who
can be appointed. Since statute takes precedence over any rules or procedures,
you might have more authority than you want. Director Reinke stated that there
was much scrutiny over each step and every word by many attorneys during this
past execution. Senator LeFavour said she hated to think of someone being
required to take another's life. She said that in worst case scenarios and for
SENATE JUDICIARY & RULES COMMITIEE
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future directors, perhaps a tightening of the verbiage would be helpful. Director
Reinke stated that participation was unquestionably voluntary. There was 110 one
that served or worked in the facility or on any facet of that execution that did not
voluntarily attend. He further stated that if the language needed to be tightened,
it would be done.
MOTION

Senator Bock moved, seconded by Senator LeFavour, to have RS 21014
returned to the sponsor. The motion carried by voice vote.

RS 21011

Relating to Execution. Lamont Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, explained
this amendment is to clarify that upon execution, the death warrant is to be returned
to the district court, making this procedure consistent with Idaho Code 19-2715.

MOTION

Senator Davis moved, seconded by Vice Chairman Vick, to print RS 21011. The
motion carried by voice vote.

RS 21016

Relating to Execution. Lamont Anderson explained this amendment seeks to
clarify the process of obtaining a death warrant, including specifying a time during
which the warrant must be obtained, sets forth a process for obtaining successive
warrants if necessary, and clarifies responsibilities if an execution does not proceed.
Some language was changed to reflect federal practices. Senator Davis asked
about the "communication proceeding" pursuant to section 20-240, Idaho Code. Mr.
Anderson said that was a typo and should have read "commutation proceeding."

MOTION

Senator Mortimer moved, seconded by Senator Lodge, to print RS 21016 with
correction of the word, commutation. The motion carried by voice vote.
Rules Review of Idaho State Police (Pending Rules) with Vice Chairman Vick,
presiding.

DOCKET NO.
11-1101-1101

Rules of the Idaho Peace Officer Standards & Training Council. William L
Flink, POST Division Administrator, explained the rule defines the terms "direction"
and "supervision" as it relates to reserve officers. Under "direction," it allows an
employing agency to utilize a Level" reserve officer to work under the immediate
presence and direction of a full-time peace officer of the same agency. The second
definition, "supervision," allows a Level I reserve officer to work by himself, but
there must be a full-time peace officer of the agency working at the same time.
Section 071 establishes that the Basic Misdemeanor Probation Academy may
operate as a closed campus if POST has dorm space available and clarifies that
a student must attend all basic academy classes to successfully complete the
course. Mr. Flink said Sections 095 and 174 establishes criteria for obtaining
credit toward higher certifications for officers who formerly served as military law
enforcement officers. The requirement that communication specialists meet the
minimum employment standards for age and traffic record is removed as well as
references to the Advanced Dispatch Academy which is no longer offered. The rule
removes confusing language in reference to canine team training and certification
requirements. The list of explosive substances used for detection canine team
certification is updated.
Senator Malloy asked with the difference of supervision for Level I and Level"
officers, would they not be acting independent of one another. Mr. Flink said they
were acting as a team, and since they only had 25 hours of training, POST Council
believed they needed supervision.
Vice Chairman Vick told Mr. Flink that he had a letter from Oliver Chase that
raised a question that this rule classifies all military law enforcement experience
as the same and was not fair.
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Mr. Flink said it was a long standing process in POST history and the POST
Council felt this was proper in evaluating training. The training may have been as
a security guard and not in line with performing law enforcement functions. Vice
Chairman Vick asked if the practice had always been to give three months of law
enforcement experience credit for each year of military service. Mr. Flink said that
was the practice, but it was not in rule.
Senator Davis suggested that POST may be undervaluing the service and
experience of the military. He wondered what standards could be adopted that
would take advantage of the disparity of applicants. It appears to be a problem.
Mr. Flink said that was what Council wrestled with and they were looking for
consistency.
Oliver Chase came to the podium, representing himself, and reiterated the
concerns that were identified in his letter. He said his concern is the discrimination
against veterans. Senator Davis asked how would he write the rule. Mr. Chase
said he would evaluate everyone based on their experience. Senator Davis asked
if he was troubled by the disparity in the classification and what they were doing in
reviewing or setting a standard for military police service. Mr. Chase said that was
right. Senator Mortimer asked if it was true that some other officer coming in for
POST certification with previous experience is being reviewed on a personal basis
and qualifications before he is given a certification. Mr. Flink said that was correct.
Senator Mortimer said then that is not the case with our military personnel. Mr.
Flink said that was correct.
MOTION

Senator Mortimer moved, seconded by Senator Malloy, to adopt Docket No.
11-1101-1101 with the exception of Subsection 095, 02 and 174, 02.

DISCUSSION

Senator Lodge asked Chairman Darrington what the procedure was if those two
sections were excluded. Chairman Darrington said it would be necessary for the
Committee to draft a resolution formally rejecting that section of the rule and that
resolution would have to pass this Committee and the floor of the Senate, the
House Committee and the floor of the House.

SUBSTITUTE
MOTION

Senator LeFavour made a substitute motion, seconded by Senator Lodge, to
adopt Docket No. 11-1101-1101 with the exception of Subsection 095,02, c and
174, 02, c. The motion failed.

MOTION

Chairman Darrington moved, seconded by Senator Davis to adopt Docket No.
11-1101-1101.

SUBSTITUTE
MOTION

Senator Mortimer made a substitute motion, seconded by Senator Malloy to adopt
Docket No. 11-1101-1101 with the exception of Subsections 095, 02, c. and d. and
174, 02, c. and d. Senator Bock requested a roll call vote. The motion carried 5 to
4 with Vice Chairman Vick, Senators Malloy, Mortimer, Nuxoll, and LeFavour voting
aye, and Chairman Darrington, Senators Davis, Lodge and Bock voting nay.

DOCKET NO.
11-1101-1102

Rules of the Idaho Peace Officer Standards & Training Council. William L.
Flink explained that there were some technical errors in Sections 91 and 92 and
POST Council would like to rewrite after subsequent review and return it at a future
meeting.

ADJOURNMENT There being no further business, Chairman Darrington adjourned the meeting
at 2:50 p.m.

Senator Darrington
Chairman

Leigh Hinds
Secretary
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SENATE JUDICIARY & RULES COMMITTEE
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Monday, February 06, 2012
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1:30 P.M.
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Room VWV54

MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Vick, Senators Davis, Lodge,
Malloy(McKague), Mortimer, Nuxoll, Bock, and LeFavour

ABSENTI
EXCUSED:
NOTE:

The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained with
the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and will then be
located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services Library.
Chairman Darrington called the meeting to order at 1:33 p.m. and asked the
secretary to call the roll.

RS 21014C1

Relating to Execution. Brent Reinke, Director of Idaho Department of Correction
(IDOC), introduced Mark Kubinski, Lead Deputy Attorney General of the Idaho
Department of Correction. Mark Kubinski explained that this RS was reformatted
from the previous RS due to the concerns of the committee members. It is basically
the same as RS 21014, but clarifies some of the confusion and by making the
language more direct. It proposes to create a new section, 19-2716A and to leave
19-2716 in tact. Subsection (1) clarifies that carrying out an execution is not the
practice of medicine and the director and individuals acting under his authority
are exempt from any legal requirements regarding the practice of medicine.
Subsection (2) of the statute allows for any entity that is authorized to possess
controlled SUbstances to be able to distribute those to the director and department
for purposes of carrying out an execution. Subsection (3) authorizes the director to
obtain, possess and store controlled substances for purposes of carrying out an
execution. This section also clarifies that employees participating in an execution
are entitled to immunity from liability or wrongful death. Lastly, he said there was an
emergency provision attached to this section.
Senator Davis asked why the emergency provision was retroactive to January 1,
2012. Mr. Kubinski said it was probably unnecessary, but was a holdover from
the previous RS.

MOTION

Senator Mortimer moved, seconded by Senator Nuxoll to print RS 21014C1. The
motion carried by voice vote.

S 1265

Relating to Execution. Brent Reinke introduced Lamont Anderson, Deputy
Attorney General of the Criminal Law Division, to present the bill. Mr. Anderson
explained the purpose of the proposed legislation was to clarify that upon execution,
the death warrant is to be returned to the district court, making this part of the
procedure consistent with Idaho Code § 19-2715.
Leo Morales, Public Education and Communications Coordinator for the American
Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, stated that they were in support of both S 1265 and
S1266 legislation.

MOTION

Senator Nuxoll moved, seconded by Senator Malloy, to send S 1265 to the Floor
with a do pass recommendation. The motion carried by voice vote.

S 1266

Relating to Execution. Mr. Anderson explained this legislation clarifies the
process of obtaining a death warrant, including specifying a time during which
the warrant must be obtained, and sets forth a process for obtaining successive
warrants if necessary. It also clarifies responsibilities if an execution does not
proceed.

MOTION

Senator Davis moved, seconded by Senator Lodge, to send S 1266 to the Floor
with a do pass recommendation. The motion carried by voice vote, with Senator
Bock and Senator LeFavour voting no.

S 1215

Relating to Escape or Rescue of Prisoners. Brent Reinke introduced Tim
Higgins, Deputy Warden, who has a background of investigation and a great
knowledge of contraband and the challenges it causes IDOC behind the fence. Mr.
Higgins explained this legislation seeks to make it harder for inmates to continue
their criminal behavior while incarcerated. Cell phones are becoming the most
sought after contraband inside the prisons today. Prisoners smuggle cell phones to
participate in drug trafficking, targeting hits on civilians in Idaho communities. He
gave an example of a recently confiscated cell phone from a gang member inside
one of their facilities; it was used 33,000 times in a period of six months which
included 11,000 telephone calls, 22,000 text message all of which bypassed the
security system as he continued to conduct gang business while incarcerated. The
proposed bill makes it a felony to possess, introduce cell phones, or any other
telecommunication into their prison system. Lastly, he stated that the proposed
Section 18-2510, Idaho Code, would enhance safety and security in correctional
facilities statewide.
Senator Davis noted that the effective date of the bill appeared to be July 1st
instead of at the signature of the Governor and he wondered if that was correct.
With the problem as significant as it was, Senator Davis thought they would rather
have it effective sooner than later. Director Reinke said they were not thinking of
having an emergency clause in the legislation, but perhaps they should pursue that.
Senator Davis asked if the Director would find it valuable to be effective with the
Governor's signature. Director Reinke replied that he would.
Senator Vick asked how long ago was tobacco banned. Mr. Higgins replied it
was about ten years. Senator Vick said that he had information from someone that
having tobacco as contraband was a positive thing compared to marijuana or some
other illegal drug. Mr. Higgins said more tobacco was smuggled in than marijuana.
One advantage they saw was that cigarette smoke would mask the smell of
marijuana, but now if they smell cigarette smoke they know it is inappropriate and
can target that very quickly. He said they were trying to stop the major flow of
tobacco products from coming in. He stated that it would be a felony for the person
introducing the contraband or for the one in possession.

MOTION

Senator Davis moved, seconded by Senator Lodge, to send S 1215 to the 14th
Order for Amendment to add the emergency clause. The motion carried by voice
vote.

APPOINTMENT

Gubernatorial Appointment. Sara B. Thomas of Meridian, Idaho was appointed
to the State Appellate Public Defender (SAP D) to serve a term commencing
January 12, 2012 and expiring August 1, 2014. Ms. Thomas has been working for
the State Appellate Public Defender since 1999. In 2002, she became Chief of the
Appellate Unit where she was second in command. She participated in various
committees including the Idaho Supreme Court's Appellate Rules Committee and
the Criminal Rules Committee. She also participated in the Idaho Criminal Justice
Commission's Sex Offender Registration Subcommittee. She stated that the way
she sees the position is to represent people in their appeals to the Idaho Supreme
Court and considers the position to, literally, be one of law enforcement. Ms.
Thomas said the Constitution has procedural statutes that protects people's rights.
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Senator Darrington asked Ms. Thomas if she saw her role as getting a person
off or protecting their rights. Ms. Thomas said the role of SAPO was protecting
someone's rights. She added that the job of SAPO was to make sure that the
Court or prosecutor did their job properly. Chairman Darrington said at the time
SAPO was created it was to help the counties financially and also to give uniform
defense counsel throughout the state on appeals. Ms. Thomas stated that those
goals had been met. After a few questions from the committee to Ms. Thomas,
Chairman Darrington said the committee would act on the confirmation at the top
of the order on Wednesday's meeting.
PRESENTATION Idaho Criminal Justice Commission Overview and Update. Brent Reinke,
Director of Idaho Department of Correction, explained that the Commission was
established in 2005 with 25 members and three major branches of government,
county, city and citizen representatives. They meet ten times a year and it truly is
an opportunity to break the process down from an educational standpoint and
they have had great success in developing relationships with all three branches
of government and with citizen representatives as well. He stated that there were
several subcommittees within the Commission and their focus this year has been:
the (1) Research Alliance chaired by Gary Raney, (2) Children of Incarcerated
Parents, sponsored by the Department of Health & Welfare, Ross Edmunds, from
the Division of Behavioral Health, (3) Public Defense, headed by Dan Chadwick,
(4) Misdemeanor Probation Project, chaired by Gary Hahn, (5) Gang Strategies
headed by Jim Tibbs, (6) Sex Offender Management Board, chaired by Shane
Evans, and the Grant Review Council which is an entirely new function of the
Commission. Slide presentation is attached.
Chief Jim Tibbs, said they would continue to look at the Gang Enforcement Act,
which was created last session, to make sure that it provides the necessary safety
and that it was constitutional. He felt it would be a tool box for communities to
use, not just enforcement.
MINUTES
MOTION

Senator Bock moved, seconded by Senator Davis, to approve the minutes of
January 30, 2012 as written. The motion carried by voice vote.

ADJOURNMENT There being no further business, Chairman Darrington adjourned the meeting
at 2:33 p.m.

Senator Darrington
Chairman

Leigh Hinds
Secretary
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MINUTES

HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES, & ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE
DATE:

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

TIME:

1:30 P.M.

PLACE:

Room EW42

MEMBERS:

Chairman Wills, Vice Chairman Luker, Representative(s) Smith(24), Nielsen,
Shirley, Hart, Bolz, Ellsworth, Bateman, McMillan, Perry, Sims, Burgoyne, Jaquet,
Killen

ABSENTI
EXCUSED:

Rep. Ellsworth

GUESTS:

Randy Colson, Idaho Towing and Recovery Professionals; Woody Richards,
Attorney/Lobbyist; Lamont Anderson, Attorney General's Office; Lt. Col. Ralph
Powell & Sharon Lamm, POST, Idaho State Police (lSP)

II

Chairman Wills called the meeting to order at 1:33 p.m.
MOTION:

Rep. Bolz made a motion to approve the minutes from the February 7,2012
meeting. Motion was carried by voice vote.
Chairman Wills recognized Drew Nelson, House Page, for her service during the
first half of this session.

H 531:

Dawn Peck, Manager of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, ISP, presented H

531. She said that after further review by the agency, the language in the bill
contained errors and fell short of the statutory goal and ISP would like to pull the
bill and introduce a replacement RS.
UNANIMOUS
CONSENT
REQUEST:

Rep. Killen requested unanimous consent to pull H 531. There being no objection,
consent was granted.

RS 21304:

Dawn Peck, ISP, presented RS 21304. She explained that RS 21304 will replace H
531 because the language in H 531 was confUSing and inadequate to accomplish
the ISP's goal for the bill. The only change is to § 49-202 (2)(q), to the word
"transfer," clarifying that this is a one time fee for vehicle title transfer that will be
used to support the Idaho Public Safety and Security Information System (more
commonly known as "ILETS"). This proposed legislation proposes to establish a
fee on the issuance or transfer of each vehicle title which will provide a stable
funding source to support and maintain ILETS. ILETS primary mission is to provide
a dedicated, secure, reliable, high-speed communications system that enables the
public safety and criminal justice communities to fulfill their missions of protecting
and serving Idaho citizens. The ILETS Board has recognized that the current
funding structure is inadequate to sustain daily operations and infrastructure need
and monies earned from this fee would go into an ILETS dedicated fund to be used
for ILETS maintenance and usage costs.
In response to committee questions, Ms. Peck stated that total annual funds earned
from this fee collection would be about $4 million. Yearly cost to keep the system
running is about $2.7 million/year. She clarified that there would be an excess, but
the Board is trying to build the fund to be able to pay for a replacement part if/when
it is needed and to make sure that they do not have to ask for increased funding for
ILETS in the near future for this purpose. Committee members requested a list of
all the fees involved with this.

Ms. Peck stated that a fee is assessed when any title transfer is made, even if the
vehicle was a gift. Also, on page 6, line 41, "all access fees collected under the
provision of this chapter," she said that these fees are outlined in IDAPA 480. The
access and system usage fees were raised in 2007 to an amount counties felt they
could absorb. The Board feels this is not enough to maintain the system, and
currently ISP is covering 48% of the costs, where they should be covering 25%.
Amy Smith, a Vehicle Services Manager for the Idaho Dept. of Transportation
(lOT), explained the breakdown of the title fee. The committee expressed concern
about the fees listed on the first two pages of the RS and questioned where the
fees, other than to ILETS, were going to be distributed. Ms. Peck stated that
the Idaho Code section that has been changed is the lOT title section, it is not
for the ILETS system.
Rep. Sims invoked Rule 38 stating a possible conflict of interest as she is an
automobile dealer, but will be voting on RS 21304.
MOTION:

Rep. Smith made a motion to introduce RS 21304.
Ms. Peck stated that she will advise the Department of Transportation (DOT)
Advisory Board about the substance of the bill. In regards to the "other vehicles"
listed on page 2, Ms. Smith said that this could be a boat or trailer, technically not a
motorized vehicle. In regards to the language she stated that this is just left over
language, as all these "other" vehicles would be included here, so the "other" is
likely unnecessary.

VOTE ON THE
MOTION:

Motion was carried by voice vote.

H 403:

Lt. Col. Ralph Powell, ISP, presented H 403. He explained the purpose of this bill
is to create a requirement for tow truck drivers who contract with the ISP to have
criminal background checks through both the FBI and Idaho criminal databases.
There is a public expectation that the tow truck driver has gone through some kind
of background check, and ISP would like to send a tow truck driver that does not
have a criminal record that includes any of the disqualifying crimes. The intent is
to make this process safer for those who are having their cars towed, under the
direction of the ISP.
In response to committee questions, Lt. Col. Powell stated that ISP is interested in
crimes committed against persons and serious property crimes when examining
someone's background. For example: battery, burglary, rape, etc. He explained
ISP is adding the federal review to the state check that is already being used. He
emphasized that it is a more comprehensive check because it is nationwide, not
just for the state of Idaho. In regards to the doubling of the fees to tow truck drivers,
he said the addition is the cost of using the FBI fingerprint-based check.

Lt. Col. Powell explained the payment for the background check would not apply
to every employee of the tow-truck company, but would apply only to the owner
and all drivers that will be responding to the scene. Lt. Col. Powell deferred to
Dawn Peck, ISP, for a question about the fee increase, which was authorized to
$25.00 for the fingerprint based check (increased from $10.00). She stated that the
fingerprint based check is important because it is a positive identification. Total fees
would be about $41 for each responding tow-truck driver.
In regards to the ability of the state to use the substance of the FBI background
checks, Lt. Col. Powell said that the authority to conduct a state background
check is governed by FBI rules and there must be a statute that authorizes ISP's
use of the FBI database. He deferred to Ms. Peck, and she said Title 67, Chapter
30 governs authority to do state background checks.
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Randy Colson, President of the Idaho Towing Recovery Professionals, stated
his concern is with the timing of the fees required. He said he would like the
fee application to happen at the time of hire. He also said there is no standard
of measure to apply this to and there needs to be a requirement in writing.
He emphasized that they are seeking a measured guideline so that tow truck
companies are able to comply.
In response to committee questions, Mr. Colson stated that the AAA background
checks do not have access to the FBI database. He said that he would be satisfied
with at least one check through the FBI based system, though it is not possible to
transfer federal information, and AAA can verify that the check was completed. In
regards to the City of Boise evaluation, the check is annual, meaning that any
crimes for the next 12-month period would be undiscovered. He emphasized that
he, as a business owner, is paying attention to the quality of his employees.
When asked if the City of Boise would be willing to accept the background check
from ISP and not require an additional check, Lt. Col. Powell said the ISP check is
completed once at the time of hire, however, Boise City requires annual checks
and he does not know what they might be willing to accept in the future. In regards
to timing of the background check, there isn't a particular time in mind and this bill
stems from a particular incident in Oregon, where a tow truck driver used by the
ISP that had various convictions in Oregon, which were not detected in the Idaho
database search.
In regards to committee concerns over whether this is an ongoing problem, Lt.
Col. Powell stated the national background check provides a comprehensive
criminal check and ISP has no current intention of changing the policy to include
itemized specifics as far as "disqualifing crimes" go. Also, the ISP procedure on
tow truck operators does not spell out the specific qualifications and ISP conducts
a case-by-case analysis when they conduct a background check. The committee
expressed a concern that there are no qualifications codified somewhere. Lt. Col.
Powell stated that if the applicant is denied approval, they have the opportunity to
meet with ISP to redress their concerns. He added that tow-truck drivers do not
have to be on the rotation list used by ISP.
When questioned, Mr. Colson stated that he was not involved in drafting this bill.
In regards to suggested changes to the bill, he would like the background check to
be conducted at the time of application to the ISP tow truck pool, and he would like
to see clarification on timing and definitions of disqualifying crimes.

MOTION:

Rep. Killen made a motion to send H 403 to the floor with a DO PASS
recommendation. In favor of the motion, Rep. Luker made a request to add
various standards to this, but overall he supports the bill due to public safety
concerns. Rep. Perry stated in opposition to the motion, she is likely not to
support the bill because of the fear that certain drivers will be excluded, the high
cost, lack of standards, and lack of strict time frames for check requirements.

SUBSTITUTE
MOTION:

Rep. Bateman made a substitute motion to hold H 403 in committee. In support of
the motion he stated that Idaho is a small state and these fees and other issues
are of great concern to Idaho's citizens.

AMENDED
SUBSTITUTE
MOTION:

Rep. Hart made an amended substitute motion to hold H 403 in committee for a
time certain, no longer than one week, for parties to get together and come up with
better language.
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ROLL CALL
VOTE ON THE
AMENDED
SUBSTITUTE
MOTION:

Chairman Wills requested a roll call vote on the amended substitute motion to hold
H 403 in committee for a time certain. Motion passed by a vote of 8 AYE, 6 NAY
and 1 absent/excused. Voting in favor of the motion: Vice Chairman Luker,
Reps. Smith(24), Nielsen, Shirley, Hart, Bolz, McMillan, and Perry. Voting in
opposition to the motion: Chairman Wills, Reps. Bateman, Sims(lngram),
Burgoyne, Jaquet, and Killen. Rep. Ellsworth was absent/excused.
H 403 will come before the committee on Thursday, February 23, 2012.

H 532:

Sharon Lamm, POST/ISP, presented H 532. She stated this will amend Idaho
Code to allow POST counsel to collect and spend fees earned from POST dormitory
usage. The fees are structured to recoup costs associated with use of training
equipment from non-law enforcement institutions. POST academy rooms are
available to non-POST entities. POST charges $10.00/nightlroom which benefits
POST and saves lodging costs for those who are using the room.
Ms. Lamm next provided responses to committee concerns from the RS hearing.
She said that in regards to concern about exemptions from the bed tax, all charges
for room occupancy that are exempt from sales tax, are exempt from the room
tax. Over 99% of POST customers receive the tax exemption and the remaining
customers are from out-of-state. In 2011, POST collected $32,000 in dormitory
fees. She emphasized that law enforcement agencies throughout the state
benefit from the use of the facility for the training they are required to complete
in order to retain their certifications. In FY2011 POST collected $80,000 from
POST-associated users and without this charge in place, POST would have to bill
these agencies about $20,000 annually for their usage.

MOTION:

Rep. Shirley made a motion to send H 532 to the floor with a DO PASS
recommendation.
In regards to an audit on the taxes being taken out, Ms. Lamm stated POST has
been audited in the past. The committee was concerned that a law enforcement
agency has been doing something they are not yet authorized to do, she said that
this is one of the areas that needed to be addressed.

VOTE ON THE
MOTION:

Motion was carried by voice vote. Rep. Shirley will sponsor the bill on the floor.

S 1265:

Brent Reinke, Director of the Idaho Dept. of Corrections (lDC), presented S 1265.
He handed out copies of IDC's standard operating procedures. He explained the
lessons learned from the November 18, 2011 execution which was the first in many
years. S 1265 addresses pre- and post- execution procedure. The purpose of the
bill is to clarify that after the execution the death warrant is to return to the district
court, which is consistent with the statute.

MOTION:

Rep. Nielsen made a motion to send S 1265 to the floor with a DO PASS
recommendation. Motion was carried by voice vote. Rep. Nielsen will sponsor
the bill on the floor.
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S 1266:

Lamont Anderson, Attorney General and Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit,
presented S 1266. He said this bill addresses "how" and "when" a warrant of
execution is obtained. It clarifies that the state of Idaho, the Idaho Supreme Court,
and Federal Courts can impose a stay of execution. Section 2 addresses procedure
for obtaining the death warrant, which occurs after unitary review by the Idaho
Supreme Court. Remittitur is executed by the Idaho Supreme Court, but the word
"prosecutor" has been changed to the "state." He explained that after a death
warrant is obtained, death sentence inmates are reviewed by federal courts. If a
stay is obtained, then a mandate is issued by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. After
this, it is possible to get a second death warrant. There also may be a situation
where the Dept. of Corrections has not been able to complete an execution by the
time allotted by the court. In this case, the bill allows the department to obtain
another warrant from the district judge with an explanation of why the execution
has not been completed. This prevents a death sentence inmate from skirting the
death sentence because of a timing issue.
In response to committee questions, Mr. Anderson said § 4, line 35, changed from
"must" to "may" because the death sentenced inmate is not actually brought into
court. In the case that the district court wants to inquire why that warrant was not
carried out, this change removes the requirement that the inmate has to be present
during this inquiry. In regards to whether a judge would want to make an inquiry,
he clarified that the judge must make an inquiry and stated it would be hard to
imagine a situation where the district judge would not want to sign an additional
death warrant. In regards to the timing of the issuance of the death warrant, he said
constitutional speedy trial requirements would govern this. Regarding line 37, the
"special specified time," Mr. Anderson stated that this is prior language from the
statute and means the warden shall execute the death warrant as specified by
the district judge.

MOTION:

Rep. Perry made a motion to send S 1266 to the floor with a DO PASS
recommendation. Motion carried by voice vote. Rep. Nielsen will sponsor the
bill on the floor.

ADJOURN:

There being no further business to come before the committee, the meeting was
adjourned at 3:23 p.m.

Representative Wills
Chair

Stephanie Nemore
Secretary

HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES, & ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

Wednesday, February 15, 2012-Minutes-Page 5

